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GENDER BIAS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S DEATH PENALTY 
ELIZABETH MARIE REZA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout American history, our legal system has struggled to provide 
equal criminal justice for all, regardless of race, religion, or gender.  No compo-
nent within that system has had greater difficulty accomplishing that goal than 
capital punishment.  The administration of the death penalty1 has remained con-
stantly under fire for its perceived discriminations, incompetent defense attor-
neys, fatal flaws, and perceived barbarity. 
In an attempt at fairness, the courts have identified a number of deficien-
cies in the system and have tried to correct them.  Most notably, in 1972, the Su-
preme Court acknowledged the widespread racial disparity between the execu-
tion of blacks and the execution of whites for the same crimes.  In an effort to 
end the “totally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death,”2 
the Court in Furman v. Georgia declared that “the imposition and the carrying 
out of the death penalty . . . constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”3  Ruling that the selective and 
arbitrary application of the death penalty was “cruel and unusual,”4 the Court 
suspended the death penalty.5 
Furman, however, left the door open for a narrow application of the death 
penalty.6  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that capital punishment 
did not always violate the Constitution and permitted the reintroduction of capi-
tal punishment, provided that states impose procedural safeguards.7  These 
safeguards include: (1) statutes “specifying the factors to be weighed and the 
procedures to be followed in deciding whether to impose a capital sentence,”8 
and (2) a “bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of 
the information relevant to the imposition of the sentence and provided with 
standards to guide its use of information.”9 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, expected May 2005; B.S., Texas A&M Uni-
versity. 
 1. The terms “capital punishment” and “death penalty” will be used interchangeably through-
out this note. 
 2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972). 
 3. Id. at 239–40. 
 4. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 5. Id. at 241. 
 6. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
 7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
 8. Id. at 180. 
 9. Id. at 195. 
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Despite these safeguards and the progress made in eliminating discrimina-
tion in the selection of those upon whom the death penalty is imposed, a glaring 
deficiency remains—that of “a system-wide apparent bias based on the gender 
of the offender.”10  Simply put, throughout the history of the American capital 
punishment system, there have been significantly fewer women both sentenced 
and executed for capital crimes than their male counterparts.  Justice Marshall 
recognized the obvious discrepancy during the Furman debate, noting: 
There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against 
men and not women.  Only 32 women have been executed since 1930, while 
3,827 men have met a similar fate.  It is difficult to understand why women have 
received such favored treatment since the purposes allegedly served by capital 
punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes.11 
Thirty-four years later, Justice Marshall’s blunt observation still rings true.  Na-
tionwide, between the years 1973 and 200212, of the 859 individuals executed,13 
only ten, or 1.2%, were women. 14 And as of 2002, of the 3,557 total prisoners on 
death row around the nation, only fifty-one, or 1.4%, are women.15 
So where does this leave us?  Why do women account for such a small per-
centage of those on death row and/or executed?  Does our capital punishment 
system discriminate in favor of women? Or can these numbers be explained in 
some other fashion? 
In an effort to answer these questions, this note will first explore the differ-
ent theories advanced to explain why some women are sentenced to capital pun-
ishment while others are spared.  The analysis will continue with a comparison 
of the women and the men in similar circumstances on North Carolina’s death 
row.  This comparison will be used to ascertain whether any of the proffered 
theories may explain the women’s death sentences. 
Between the years 1976 and 2002, women committed only 12.1%16 of the 
512,599 homicides committed in the United States.17  Additionally, women per-
petrated only 6.3% of all multiple victim homicides and 6.6% of all felony mur-
ders.  However women committed 36.3% of all intimate homicides.18 
 
 10. Victor Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 433 (2002) [hereinafter Gendering the Death Penalty]. 
 11. Furman, 408 U.S. at 365. 
 12. The time span between 1973 and the present will be denoted as the “modern era” to distin-
guish the application of modern capital punishment statutes from the pre-Furman statutes. 
 13. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2002, NCJ 201848, Nov. 2003, at 10 [hereinaf-
ter BJS Capital Punishment]. 
 14. Victor Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, through June 20, 2003, 
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.htm (last modified July 1, 2003) [hereinafter Fe-
male Offenders, 1973 to 2003]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S., Trends by Gender, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/gender.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter BJS 
Trends by Gender]. 
 17. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S., Intimate Homicide, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/intimates.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter BJS 
Intimate  Homicide]. 
 18. Id. 
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In a gender-neutral capital punishment system, the number of women sen-
tenced to death row should be proportionate, based on their percentage of 
homicide commissions, to that of their male counterparts.  Yet, as noted above, 
only 1.2% of all executions in the modern era have been women; this means that 
98.8% of those executed are men.19  Superficially, it appears that gender bias and 
discrimination affect the application of the death penalty.  However, as noted by 
Professor Elizabeth Rapaport, successful litigation asserting gender discrimina-
tion20 in capital death sentencing seems highly unlikely in light of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in McClesky v. Kemp,21 and the standard it set forth.22 
In McCleskey, the Court addressed whether McCleskey, an African-
American death row inmate, might challenge his death sentence under the 
Equal Protection Clause by demonstrating statistically that Georgia’s capital 
punishment scheme was administered in a racially discriminatory manner.23  
Specifically, McCleskey attempted to prove that blacks convicted of murdering 
whites were more likely to be sentenced to death than whites convicted of mur-
dering whites.24  McCleskey offered as evidence for his claims a comprehensive 
study prepared by Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George 
Woodworth (“The Baldus Study”)25 which utilized statistical methods to exam-
ine over 2000 Georgia murder cases to determine when it was most likely that 
an offender would be sentenced to death.26 
The Baldus Study determined that, at the time, an offender convicted of 
murdering a white person was 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death 
than one whose victim was of another race.27  The Baldus Study additionally 
concluded that prosecutors asked for the death penalty in 70% of all cases in 
which black defendants killed white victims, and the death penalty was im-
posed in 22% of these situations.28  Comparatively, the death penalty was re-
quested in only 32% of those cases involving whites murdering whites, and im-
posed in only 8% of such cases.29  Though the Supreme Court accepted the raw 
conclusions of the Baldus Study, the Court ultimately held: (1) under the Four-
teenth Amendment, McCleskey failed to show that he had personally been the 
victim of intentional discrimination or that the system was intentionally dis-
 
 19. See Female Offenders 1973-2003, supra note 14; BJS Capital Punishment, supra note 13. 
 20. The terms “gender bias” and “gender discrimination” will be used interchangeably 
throughout. 
 21. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 22. Elizabeth Rapaport,  Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 501, 506–07 (1990) [hereinafter Questions About Gender]. 
 23. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
 24. Id. at 292–99. 
 25. David C. Baldus et. al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Geor-
gia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY  661 (1983). 
 26. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
 27. Id. at 287. 
 28. Id. at 286–87. 
 29. Id. 
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criminatory,30 and (2) under the Eighth Amendment, the risk of discrimination 
demonstrated by the Baldus study did not rise to a substantial level.31 
In applying the McCleskey standard of proof for racial discrimination in 
capital sentencing to a hypothetical claim of gender discrimination in capital 
sentencing, Rapaport writes that male offenders “could not expect to success-
fully challenge the death penalty on the grounds that males are disproportion-
ately selected for death.”32  She posits that under the McCleskey standard, male 
offenders would have to prove purposeful discrimination—a virtually impossi-
ble task.33  As Justice Powell wrote in McCleskey, “the claim that [McCleskey’s] 
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply 
to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in 
other minority groups, and even to gender”.34  Rapaport ultimately concludes 
that litigation of gender discrimination in the application of capital sentencing is 
highly unlikely to succeed.35 
II.  SOCIETY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD SENTENCING WOMEN TO DIE 
Despite Rapaport’s understandable cynicism regarding the possibility of 
successful litigation of gender discrimination claims based upon statistical 
analysis, a number of gender bias theories based on the attitudes of those in-
volved in the criminal justice system, whether conscious or subconscious, have 
been offered to explain the presence of so few women on death row throughout 
the nation.36 
A.  Chivalry 
A major hypothesis offered in explanation for the small percentage of 
women on death row is the chivalry, or paternalism, hypothesis.  Proponents of 
the chivalry hypothesis suggest that Americans have a “chivalrous disinclina-
tion to sentence women to die.”37  This theory suggests that because women are 
stereotyped as weak, passive, and requiring male protection,38 “women are less 
responsible for their actions, hence less culpable, and perhaps also as posing less 
continuing danger to society.”39  This attitude was recognized and further en-
couraged by judges in the 1970s who came to regard female offenders as more 
 
 30. Id. at 292–99 
 31. Id. at 308–309. 
 32. Questions about Gender, supra note 22, at 507. 
 33. Id. at 508. 
 34. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Powell, J. in McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–317). 
 35. See id at 508.  Note that no Baldus-type study has been done to analyze the impact an of-
fender’s gender has upon the offender’s sentence of death. 
 36. Victor Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 874 (1989) [hereinafter 
Death Penalty for Females]. 
 37. Questions about Gender, supra note 22, at 504. 
 38. Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women, and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 456 (2000) [hereinafter Unequal Before the Law]. 
 39. Questions about Gender, supra note 22, at 512. 
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amenable to rehabilitation than men.40  However, rehabilitation was, and nor-
mally still is, reserved for those women who “fit into the role society has made 
for them and who have conformed to gender stereotypes.”41 
Perhaps one of the most commonly cited examples of the chivalry hypothe-
sis in action is the execution of Ethel Spinelli of California.  In 1941, thirty of her 
fellow San Quentin inmates petitioned the Governor of California in opposition 
of Ms. Spinelli’s execution.42  Her fellow inmates claimed her execution would be 
dishonorable—“a blot on the reputation of the state and ‘repulsive to the people 
of California’ because of her sex and her status as a mother.”43  The petitioners 
even offered to draw straws to be executed in her place should the governor re-
fuse clemency.44  The behavior and attitude of Ms. Spinelli’s fellow inmates is 
merely one example of the difficulty American society has, as a result of the  
characteristics stereotypically attributed to women, in condemning female mur-
derers to death regardless of the heinous nature of their crimes.45 
The chivalry hypothesis suggests that the death penalty is “perceived as the 
ultimate sanction for violating the social values and rights that society chooses 
to protect.”46  However, the chivalry hypothesis does not preclude punishing 
women who reject stereotypical roles—it instead offers rewards and protection 
for those women whose crimes conform to gender stereotypes. 
B. The “Evil Woman” 
A second and related hypothesis focuses on the particular societal menace 
posed by women who defy traditional gender roles. Dubbed the “evil woman” 
theory, this theory finds that women who commit violent and serious offenses 
are sentenced more harshly than their male counterparts and are punished not 
only for their crimes, but for violating sex-role expectations.47  Consistent with 
the chivalry theory, “[o]nce convicted of capital murder, some [women] are 
more likely to land on death row than others, not because they committed the 
worst crimes as defined by statutory law, but because they do not properly enact 
a feminine gender identity.”48 
Under the “evil woman” theory, a judge or jury has no choice but to sen-
tence a woman to death when her crime so offends society due to its unspeaka-
bly heinous and “unladylike” nature.  As such, when a female offender engages 
in behavior that is deemed to be “male” or “manly,” she loses the advantages 
 
 40. Melinda E. O’Neil, The Gender Gap Argument: Exploring the Disparity of Sentencing Women to 
Death, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 218 (1999) [hereinafter The Gender Gap Ar-
gument]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp of the 21st 
Century, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 581, 588 (2000) [hereinafter Equality of the Damned].  See also Unequal 
Before the Law, supra note 38 at 456–57. 
 43. Id. Equality of the Damned, supra note 42, at 588-89. 
 44. Id. at 589. 
 45. See Unequal Before the Law, supra note 38, at 457. 
 46. Id. at 456. 
 47. Questions about Gender, supra note 232, at 513. 
 48. Id. 
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and protections of her gender.49  This woman must be punished more severely 
than other women because she committed a heinous and horrific crime and, 
more importantly, because she has violated and rejected the stereotype of the 
“gentler sex.”50  Thus, when a woman chooses to reject this expectation, she is 
punished severely for not living up to society’s expectations51 or for stepping 
outside of her gender role.52  The legal system is thus obligated to rein her in and 
dispose of such an “evil” woman in order to maintain a protective, paternalistic 
society.53  Under this hypothesis, women are most vulnerable to society’s rebuke 
when they “step outside the bounds of normative femininity.”54  As a result of 
their crimes, these women are no longer perceived as the “gentler sex,” but are 
instead perceived as “crazed monsters” who deserve “nothing more than exter-
mination.”55 
III.  STATUTORY BIAS 
A second major source of gender bias involves the statutory law itself.56  In 
arguing for “gender equality,” many claim that capital punishment statutes are 
gender neutral, insuring that women who commit violent and serious offenses 
are treated no differently than their male counterparts.57  However, there re-
mains a noticeable difference between the number of women on death row and 
the number of men on death row.  Though women account for approximately 
12% of all homicides committed58 and 10% of all murder arrests,59 under this al-
legedly gender neutral statutory system, women comprise only 1.4% of the cur-
rent death row population60 and only 1.2% of those executed in the modern era.61 
The most logical and seemingly apparent explanation for this disparity is 
that the current statutory capital punishment system is not gender-neutral.  Cur-
rent death penalty statutes provide specific aggravating and mitigating factors 
that may significantly affect the punishment inflicted upon the particular of-
fender.  Though the statutes do not explicitly include the gender of the defen-
dant as a factor for consideration, such factors, as noted below, may tend to in-
 
 49. As afforded to her under the chivalry hypothesis. 
 50. The Gender Gap Argument, supra note 410, at 221. 
 51. Claudia Dreifus, Women on Death Row, MS. MAGAZINE., Spring 2003, at 74, available at 
http://www.msmagazine.com/mar03/dreifus.asp (last visited March 5, 2005). 
 52. Gender Gap Arguement, supra note 40, at 221. 
 53. Unequal Before the Law, supra note 398, at 459. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Death Penalty for Females, supra note 376, at 878. 
 56. Id. at 874. 
 57. Questions about Gender, supra note 232, at 509-10; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Pen-
alty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REVIEW 367, 374 (1991) [hereinafter Gender Discrimina-
tion]. 
 58. BJS Trends by Gender, supra note 16. 
 59. Female Offenders,1973 to 2003, supra note 154 at 3. 
 60. BJS Capital Punishment, supra note 13. 
 61. Female Offenders, 1973 to 2003, supra note 154 at 3. 
080305 REZA.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
 GENDER BIAS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S DEATH PENALTY 185 
herently encourage capital punishment for male defendants.62  Thus, when cou-
pled with the gender bias theories noted above,63 the current statutory scheme 
makes it highly probable that most women, save the most heinous, unrepentant 
and “manly” of murderesses, will never see the inside of death row. 
A. Aggravating Factors 
To sentence an offender to death under the current capital punishment 
scheme, most states require that a jury: (1) conclude the defendant committed 
murder, (2) identify aggravating factors present, and (3) determine that the miti-
gating factors do not outweigh the aggravating factors present.64 
North Carolina’s aggravating circumstances include the following: murder 
committed while in prison, murder committed by one previously convicted of 
another capital felony, murder committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting arrest, murder committed during a felony, murder committed for pecu-
niary gain, murder of a law enforcement officer, murder which was part of a 
crime spree, and murder that was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”65 
Facially, these statutes appear to be gender neutral.  Yet, during the mod-
ern era, men accounted for 93.3% of all felony murders and 93.5% of homicides 
involving multiple victims, two factors which play a prominent role in the statu-
tory schemes noted above.66  In contrast, women are rarely involved in the com-
mission of felony murders and/or murder of multiple victims.  They account for 
only 6.7% of felony murders and 6.5% of homicides involving multiple victims.67  
Moreover, women tend to have less significant prior criminal histories when 
compared to their male counterparts and are more likely to be first-time offend-
ers.68  Also, women tend to have committed fewer previous violent crimes than 
men.69  Rapaport’s research posits that three of the most influential factors in 
sentencing an offender to death are: (1) the offender’s prior criminal record, (2) 
the seriousness of the offense, and (3) the offender’s degree of culpability.70 
Given this theory, when analyzing Rapaport’s influential factors and the above 
data together under North Carolina’s death penalty statute, it becomes obvious 
that North Carolina’s statute tends to discriminate in favor of women. According 
 
 62. See infra Part B(1); see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A 
Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1516 (1996) [hereinafter 
Domestic Discount]. 
 63. See infra Part B. 
 64. Gendering the Death Penalty, supra note 110, at 459–460. 
 65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003). 
 66. BJS Intimate Homicide, supra note 187. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Death Penalty for Females, supra note 376, at 874–75. 
 69. Id. at 875.  As of 1986, twenty percent of all males facing the death penalty had a prior con-
viction for a violent felony compared to five percent of similarly situated females.  Gender Discrimina-
tion, supra note 57, at 372. 
 70. Gender Discrimination, supra note 587, at 375.  See  also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(a) (a 
mitigating circumstance to be considered during imposition of the death penalty is that the defen-
dant has “no significant history of prior criminal activity”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (stating 
that a mitigating circumstance to be considered includes the fact that the defendant had “no signifi-
cant history of prior criminal activity”). 
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to the above-noted research,71 women rarely commit the types of crimes for 
which the North Carolina statute would find aggravating circumstances.  As a 
result, fewer women are sentenced to death.  Yet, when the small percentage of 
women that do meet Rapaport’s factors come before a jury, the jury finds it much 
easier to determine that aggravating factors are present and to sentence the 
woman to death. 
B. The “Domestic Discount”72 
According to Professor Rapaport, “three kinds of murders are stigmatized 
as sufficiently heinous to expose their perpetrators to the risk of capital sentenc-
ing in at least half of the thirty-four states that employ aggravating factors in 
their capital statutory schemes.”:73 (1) “murder for gain or advantage,” (2) “mur-
der in the course of resisting law enforcement,” and (3) murder with “excep-
tional cruelty, [multiple killings], or [the placing of] many at risk of death.”74  
Yet, neither of these three types of murder, nor the aggravating factors enumer-
ated above, take into consideration the rate at which females commit domestic 
murder or the murder of intimates.  During the modern era, women committed 
36.3% of all domestic/intimate murders.75  One would assume that given such a 
high rate of commission in comparison to other murders, such as felony murder 
or multiple homicides, women who murder intimates would abound on death 
row.  However, such an assumption does not take into consideration a couple of 
factors—namely that the circumstances involved in the commission of domestic 
murders which prevent such murders from being included in the list of aggra-
vating factors and the effect that both the chivalry and “evil woman” theories 
have on the death sentences of women.  Of the four women on North Carolina’s 
death row, two were convicted of murdering their husband or boyfriend for pe-
cuniary gain; no evidence was offered to show that these murders were justified 
responses to domestic abuse.76 
C. Mitigation 
The North Carolina statute described above also requires that the sentenc-
ing authority recognize mitigating factors present in the commission of the 
murder.77  If such factors are present, the jury must weigh them against the pres-
ence of any aggravating factors found; if the mitigating circumstances “out-
weigh” the aggravating factors, then the jury cannot impose the death penalty.78 
Consistent with the chivalry and “evil woman” theories, when juries delib-
erate regarding mitigation, it is often presumed that when a woman commits a 
 
 71. See infra Part B(1). 
 72. This title comes from Professor Elizabeth Rapaport’s article, Capital Murder and the Domestic 
Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1996). 
 73. Questions  About Gender, supra note 232, at 557. 
 74. Id. 
 75. BJS Trends by Gender, supra note 16. 
 76. See infra Part C(2). 
 77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§15A-2000 (f)(2), (6), (5), and (9). 
 78. N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000(b)(2). 
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homicide with a male co-defendant, the male is found to be the dominant actor 
in the relationship,79 and the female is seen as under the control or domination of 
her male co-defendant.80  This presumption explains why the majority of women 
who have been executed or are currently on death row committed their murders 
without a male co-defendant.81 
Additionally, in the commission of domestic murders, women are more 
likely to be involved in sudden, unplanned acts.82  The law is therefore more in-
clined to treat domestic killings as “motivated by such emotions as deserving of 
some degree of mitigation of blame and punishment.”83  Usually, a defendant in 
a classic domestic murder situation84 offers in mitigation a heat of passion de-
fense.85  Examples of this defense are that of a man returning home who is unex-
pectedly confronted with the sight of his wife in the arms of another man and 
kills one or both, or a woman killing her batterer in response to abuse.86  The kill-
ings are not then considered murder, but are instead reduced to manslaughter.87 
The availability of mitigating factors in capital punishment statutes also 
explains why women who murder their children, such as Susan Smith, are 
unlikely to be sentenced to death.  In October of 1994, Susan Smith strapped her 
two young sons into their car seats and rolled her car into a lake, drowning the 
two boys.88  At trial, the defense painted Susan as a victim of sexual abuse at the 
hands of her stepfather,89 a woman with an unfaithful husband,90 and a woman 
whose lover rejected her to avoid the complications associated with becoming a 
father-figure.91  After being sentenced to life in prison, the jurors stated that they 
believed “Susan was a really disturbed person, [and] [g]iving her the death pen-
 
 79. Gendering the Death Penalty, supra note 10, at 462–63. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Death Penalty for Females, supra note 376, at 878. A notable exception is the case of Karla Faye 
Tucker.  She and her boyfriend intended to intimidate and rob a man, as well as steal the man’s mo-
torcycle.  After entering the man’s apartment and finding him asleep, Tucker hit the man with a 
pickax while her boyfriend bludgeoned the man with a hammer.  Questions about Gender, supra note 
22, at 534-36.  Rapaport writes: 
Tucker is a paradigmatic example of at least one type of female murderer, male-like in her 
aggressiveness, drawn to violence, under no man’s domination or control.  At the same 
time, she is the female exemplar of the most feared kind of modern era violent criminal, 
for whom material motives if present are a thin coating over essentially sadistic crime. 
Id. at 536. 
 82. Death Penalty for Females, supra note 376, at 876.  Note, though, that those women on death 
row were sentenced for the predatory killings of intimates.  Domestic Discount, supra note 63, at 1516. 
 83. Domestic Discount, supra note 632, at 1516. 
 84. The “classic domestic murder situation” spoken of here will refer to a murder for which the 
defendant is charged with manslaughter as a result of the mitigating factors cited above. 
 85. Domestic Discount, supra note 632, at 1516 . 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Gender Gap Argument, supra note 410, at 230. 
 89. Id. at 229. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 230.  In her lover’s infamous break-up note, Susan is told that though he [her lover] 
“could really fall for her, there were ‘things about [her] that aren’t suited to [him], and yes, [he is] 
speaking about [her] children.’”  Id. 
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alty wouldn’t serve justice.”92  In Susan Smith’s case, the chivalry hypothesis 
completely overshadowed the “evil woman” theory—a woman who murdered 
her children in hope of reuniting with her lover was instead seen as a victim and 
a loving mother with severe emotional issues.93 
D. Murder for Economic Gain 
Aside from the cases in which women are found to have committed domes-
tic murders under the influence of powerful emotion, there is a second type of 
domestic crime that transcends society’s chivalrous inclinations against killing 
women and relies upon the “evil woman” theory in sentencing women who 
murder intimates.  Rapaport defines “murder for gain or advantage” as a mur-
der that involves the killing of an intimate for pecuniary gain.94  Women who 
commit these crimes are not considered to be “domestic” murderers in the usual 
sense.  They have not reacted instinctively during the “heat of passion;” they 
have not lashed out while under extreme emotional stress.  Instead, these 
women have committed what are essentially premeditated “economic crimes 
with intimate victims.”95 
Of the women on death row, nearly two-thirds murdered family members 
and sexual intimates for pecuniary gain, a motive rarely witnessed in male do-
mestic murders.96  In contrast, a majority of those men on death row for domestic 
murders are there for killing their wives and lovers “in retaliation for leaving a 
sexual relationship.”97  Additionally, female domestic murderers who kill inti-
mates and who are on death row are more likely to have hired someone to kill 
their intimate partner.98  In fact, as of June 2001, eight of the fifty-two women on 
death row had been convicted of hiring someone to kill their husbands.99 
Thus, the bulk of women’s domestic death row cases cannot be classified 
under the traditional definition of “domestic violence.”  If their crimes did fall 
under this classic definition, the women who have been executed would still be 
alive today and those currently on death row most likely would not be awaiting 
death.  These women’s crimes differ inherently from the traditional domestic 
violence murder; these murders are not committed against intimates out of fear, 
but in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner.  As a result, society punishes 
the “evil woman” for rejecting her role in society with the most severe punish-
ment available. 
The next section will focus on the four North Carolina women currently 
awaiting execution.  The aggravating factors found in each woman’s case will be 
analyzed and compared to case of men of the same county in North Carolina 
who were similarly convicted under the same aggravating factors.  The applica-
 
 92. Id. at 231. 
 93. See id. at 232. 
 94. Questions about Gender, supra note 22, at 557. 
 95. Domestic Discount, supra note 632, at 1518. 
 96. Id. at 1517. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Gendering the Death Penalty, supra note 10, at 460. 
 99. Domestic Discount, supra note 632, at 1517. 
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tion of these aggravating factors will then be analyzed under the various theo-
ries offered above. 
IV.  NORTH CAROLINA 
A. Statutes 
Under North Carolina law, once a defendant has been found guilty of a 
capital felony and the State has given notice of its intent to seek the death pen-
alty, a separate sentencing proceeding is held to determine whether the defen-
dant will be sentenced to death or life in prison.100  The jury then hears evidence 
and deliberates to determine: (1) whether any sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist; (2) whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh 
the aggravating circumstances; and (3) based on the first two conclusions, 
whether the defendant is to be sentenced to death or life in prison.101  If the jury 
unanimously recommends death, the jury must enumerate the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances found and state its finding that the mitigating circum-
stance(s) were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.102 
 
 100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (a)(1) (2004). 
 101. Id. at (b)(1)–(3). 
 102. Id. at (e)–(f). The statutory aggravating circumstances under North Carolina law are as fol-
lows: 
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated. (2)  The defendant 
had been previously convicted of another capital felony or had been previously adjudi-
cated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a capi-
tal felony if committed by an adult. (3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person or had been previously adjudi-
cated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class 
A, B1, B2, C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person if the of-
fense had been committed by an adult. (4) The capital felony was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (5) The 
capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or abet-
tor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempt-
ing to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, 
or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device 
or bomb. (6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (7) The capital felony 
was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or 
the enforcement of laws. (8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement 
officer, employee of the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former 
judge or justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or for-
mer witness against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official duties 
or because of the exercise of his official duty. (9) The capital felony was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel. (10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more 
than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to 
the lives of more than one person. (11) The murder for which the defendant stands con-
victed was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which in-
cluded the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another per-
son or persons. 
The mitigating factors available for juror consideration are the following: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (2) The capital fel-
ony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional 
disturbance. (3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant’s homicidal con-
duct or consented to the homicidal act. (4) The defendant was an accomplice in or acces-
sory to the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively 
minor. (5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. 
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B. The Women of Death Row 
Currently, of the 191 offenders on North Carolina’s death row, four are 
women—Christina Walters, Carlette Parker, Blanche Taylor Moore and Patricia 
Jennings.103  Since the imposition of Jennings’s and Moore’s death sentences in 
November of 1990,104 a total of 251 people have been sentenced to death in North 
Carolina (including the four women mentioned).105  Of those, 243 are men and 
eight are women.106  Fifty-one of the 243 men have subsequently been removed 
from death row (either via re-sentencing to life-in-prison or by order of a new 
trial)107 and twelve have been executed.108  Of the eight women sentenced to 
death since 1990, four have been removed from death row.109 
Below are profiles of the four women currently on North Carolina’s death 
row.  Their cases are outlined and the jury’s finding of statutory aggravating 
and mitigating factors have been included for use in later analysis. 
1. Patricia W. Jennings 
On October 8, 1990, a Wilson County jury sentenced Patricia Jennings to 
death.110  At the time of her sentencing, Patricia Jennings was only the fifth 
woman sentenced to death in North Carolina during the modern era.111 
In June 1983, Jennings was working at a nursing home when she met Wil-
liam Henry Jennings, a retired businessman in his seventies who frequently 
counseled the home’s alcoholic patients.112  Four years later, the two married; 
Jennings was forty-four and her new husband was seventy-seven.113  A short 
time after their marriage, Mr. Jennings consulted his financial advisor and trans-
ferred half of his assets, totaling approximately $150,000, to Jennings.114  At trial, 
several acquaintances of Mr. Jennings testified that Mrs. Jennings physically 
 
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired. (7) The age of the defendant at 
the time of the crime. (8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon 
or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of the felony. (9) 
Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigat-
ing value. 
 103. North Carolina Department of Correction, Women on Death Row, at http://www.doc.state. 
nc.us/DOP/deathpenalty/women.htm (last visited March 5, 2005). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id.; See also North Carolina Department of Correction, Persons Removed from Death Row 
since North Carolina’s death penalty was reinstated in 1977, at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/DOP/ 
deathpenalty/removed.htm (last visited March 5, 2005) [hereinafter Persons Removed from Death 
Row]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. State v. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 1993). 
 111. See Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 1065. 
 112. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 192. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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abused her husband by beating him, dragging him across the room and stomp-
ing on him with cowboy boots.115 
In September 1989, while staying at a hotel, Mrs. Jennings called the hotel 
desk to inform them she had a “code blue.” The paramedics were called and 
Mrs. Jennings was found performing CPR on her husband’s nude body.116  Ac-
cording to the paramedics, Mr. Jennings’ body appeared cool and stiff and Mrs. 
Jennings was wearing brown cowboy boots.117  It was later determined that Mr. 
Jennings had been dead for approximately six to eight hours.118  An autopsy re-
vealed that Mr. Jennings had been kicked or stomped in the abdomen and had 
been sexually assaulted and tortured.119 
At trial, the defendant attempted to explain her husband’s injuries by testi-
fying that he had fallen in the bathroom earlier on the day of his death and, as a 
result of his depression, had been picking his rectum.120  The jury, however, 
found Mrs. Jennings guilty of her husband’s murder, finding three aggravating 
circumstances present in Mr. Jennings’ death: (1) the murder was committed 
while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit a sex offense, (2) 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and (3) the murder was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel.121  The jury also found that Mr. Jennings’ mur-
der was premeditated and deliberate.122 
On mandatory appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court found no error 
in the jury’s determination that Mrs. Jennings murdered her husband during a 
sex offense when she “penetrated [Mr.] Jennings’ anus ‘by force or threat of 
force . . . sufficient to overcome any resistance which the victim might make, and 
that the victim did not consent and it was against his will.’”123  The Court also 
found that the evidence showed that Mr. Jennings suffered injuries to his body, 
including his anus and genitalia, in the day before his death and that a blunt ob-
ject was inserted into the anus, causing the membrane to split (not a rectal ther-
mometer, fingernails or constipation, as Mrs. Jennings had claimed).124 
Regarding the jury’s finding that the murder was committed for pecuniary 
gain, the Court found sufficient evidence that Mrs. Jennings murdered her 
nearly eighty-year-old husband for the purpose of obtaining and controlling his 
wealth.125  Citing Mr. Jennings’ transfer of nearly $150,000 to his wife at the be-
ginning of their marriage, the consistent depletion of Mr. Jennings’ remaining 
personal account up to the time of his death, and Mr. Jennings’ request, prior to 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 193. 
 120. Id. at 194. 
 121. Id. at 206. 
 122. Id. at 213. 
 123. Id. at 208. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 210. 
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his death, that funds no longer be transferred to his wife, the Court found ample 
evidence that Mr. Jennings’ murder was committed for pecuniary gain.126 
The Court also found that the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” na-
ture of the murder supported a sentence of death.127  Evidence was presented 
that Mr. Jennings suffered severe blows to the abdomen (which did not result in 
death), the presence of multiple defensive injuries, a large amount of analgesic 
in his bloodstream, a large amount of blood spattered all over the hotel room 
and internal hemorrhaging that would have caused severe pain, eventual un-
consciousness, and death.128  The Court found this evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the killing was “excessively brutal and physically agonizing, con-
scienceless, pitiless and unnecessarily torturous” to Mr. Jennings.129 
One statutory mitigating circumstance was offered: the defendant had no 
record of criminal conviction.130  The defense additionally submitted twenty-one 
non-statutory mitigating circumstances.131  The jury, however, ultimately found 
the proffered statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances insufficient 
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances; the Supreme Court found no er-
ror.132  Mrs. Jennings’s death sentence was upheld.133 
2. Blanche Taylor Moore 
On November 16, 1990, a Forsyth County jury found Blanche Moore guilty 
of murdering her former boyfriend, Raymond Reid.134  The diagnosis of Moore’s 
then-husband, Reverend Dwight Moore, with arsenic poisoning had sparked an 
investigation which led to the eventual exhumation of the bodies of Moore’s fa-
ther, Moore’s first husband and Reid.135 
 
 126. Id. at 211. 
 127. Id. at 206. 
 128. Id. at 213. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 206. 
 131. Id. at 206.  The non-statutory mitigating circumstances submitted were as follows: 
the defendant had been a peaceful person in the community in which she lived; the defen-
dant was a law-abiding citizen . . .; the defendant was a recovering alcoholic; the defen-
dant successfully raised three children; the defendant was the grandmother of three 
grandchildren; the defendant’s parents were victims of alcoholism; the defendant had en-
dured a bilateral mastectomy; the defendant had been active in community volunteer or-
ganizations; the defendant experienced the death of an infant daughter; the defendant saw 
the need to improve herself educationally; the defendant became a licensed cosmetologist, 
a licensed practical nurse, and a registered nurse; the defendant was currently a registered 
nurse who worked at three hospitals; the defendant had useful work skills; the defendant 
performed deeds of kindness during her lifetime; the defendant held the leadership posi-
tion of lead and charge nurse; the defendant suffered an automobile accident in 1973; the 
defendant had no prior record for violent crimes; the defendant’s childhood history, back-
ground and record show no indication of a habitually violent nature; the defendant had 
the support of her family; the defendant was gainfully employed as a nurse prior to her 
marriage; and any other circumstances the jury found to have mitigating value. 
Id. at 206.  These mitigating factors appear to have been offered in an attempt to appeal to the jury’s 
sense that this woman had played the role of a good mother/grandmother and nurse. 
 132. See id. at 194, 212. 
 133. Id. at 192. 
 134. State v. Blanche Taylor Moore, 440 S.E.2d 797, 802 (N.C. 1994). 
 135. Id. 
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Moore met Reid while working at a Kroger supermarket in 1962; the two 
later began dating in 1979.136  On New Year’s Day 1986, Reid became ill after 
having spent New Year’s Eve with Moore and eating Moore’s homemade 
soup.137  Reid, who had never missed a day of work prior to his illness, missed 
over a month of work in the ensuing months and was eventually admitted to the 
hospital with symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.138  Initially diagnosed 
with gastroenteritis, Reid’s condition continued to deteriorate until it was “life 
threatening.”139  After his transfer to another hospital, Reid’s lab report showed 
high levels of arsenic in his system; his doctor never saw the report.140 
During his hospitalization, Moore asked permission to bring food from 
home to Reid.141  Moore often brought iced tea, frozen yogurt, milk shakes and 
soup to Reid as he became progressively weaker and required mechanical venti-
lation.142  After approximately six months of hospitalization, Reid “coded” and 
the doctors were unable to revive him.143  At the time, Moore insisted that no au-
topsy be performed on Reid’s body.144 
Three years later, and after Moore’s current husband was diagnosed with 
arsenic poisoning, investigators began looking into the suspicious deaths of 
Moore’s father, her first husband, and Reid.145  Investigators subsequently ex-
humed Reid’s body.146  An autopsy showed that the arsenic in Reid’s liver was 
thirty times higher than normal, and the arsenic levels in his brain were sixty-
seven times higher than normal.147 
Upon finding Moore guilty of first-degree murder, the jury found as aggra-
vating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and (2) 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.148  On mandatory appeal, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that: (1) Reid gave 
Moore $10,000 because she was unemployed, (2) Reid desired that Moore re-
ceive one-third of his estate upon his death, (3) Reid changed his will giving 
Moore power of attorney and a one-third share in his estate, and (4) Moore re-
ceived $45,000 from Reid’s insurance proceeds in addition to one-third of her 
share in his estate.149 
 
 136. Id. at 803. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 804. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 802. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 804–05. 
 148. Id. at 824. 
 149. Id. at 822.  Reid’s children later learned that Moore was not entitled to her alleged share of 
the insurance proceeds as Reid never added her as a beneficiary.  Moore refused to return the por-
tion of the insurance proceeds paid to her by Reid’s sons. 
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The Court also found sufficient evidence that Reid’s murder was “espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel.”150  Noting that Moore slowly poisoned Reid 
over a period of ten months, causing him to suffer prolonged physical agony, 
including paralysis, skin splitting and multiple systems failure, the Court found 
no error in the jury’s conclusion.151 
Though the jury found that Moore “provided abundantly for the needs of 
her children while they were growing up,” that Moore “peacefully submitted 
herself” when informed of the warrant for her arrest and that Moore “demon-
strated concern and kindness for others in her community” as mitigating factors, 
these mitigating factors were insufficient to outweigh the above-mentioned ag-
gravating circumstances, and Moore’s sentence of death was upheld.152 
3. Carlette Parker 
After finding Carlette Parker guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree 
kidnapping, a Wake County jury sentenced her to death on April 1, 1999.153  At 
trial, the State presented evidence showing that on May 12, 1998, Parker encoun-
tered her eighty-six year old victim, Alice Covington, in a Kroger parking lot in 
Raleigh.154  Parker knew her victim, as she had previously served as a home-
health care worker for Covington’s friend and neighbor.155 
Between nine and ten o’clock on the morning of May 12th, three witnesses 
saw Ms. Covington struggling with a “heavyset” black woman in the Kroger 
parking lot.156  The witnesses stated that Ms. Covington attempted to flee by hit-
ting the “heavyset” woman over the head with her purse.157  Later that after-
noon, Ms. Covington was driven against her will to a bank teller window.158  A 
“heavyset” black woman gave the teller a withdrawal slip in the amount of 
$2,500 and provided Ms. Covington’s driver’s license.159  When the teller looked 
into the car, she saw Ms. Covington in the passenger seat—she was not moving 
and appeared to be napping.160 
After withdrawing the $2,500 from Ms. Covington’s bank account, Parker 
drove Ms. Covington back to the same Kroger parking lot from which she had 
been abducted.161  Parker then moved the very-much-alive Ms. Covington to 
Parker’s car and drove the two to Parker’s trailer.162  Parker then drowned Ms. 
Covington in the bathtub, and proceeded to undress her body, wash her cloth-
ing, redress Ms. Covington, then leave Ms. Covington’s body in Parker’s vehi-
 
 150. Id. at 823. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 806. 
 153. State v. Parker, 553 S.E.2d 885, 890 (N.C. 2001). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  Carlette Parker had previously been described as a “heavyset black woman.”  Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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cle.163  Parker then left in another vehicle to attend a family party, after which she 
drove around for several hours.164 
The next morning, Parker returned to the same Kroger parking lot and 
transferred Ms. Covington’s body to the front seat of Ms. Covington’s vehicle.165  
After driving around in Ms. Covington’s car for several hours with Ms. Coving-
ton’s dead body in the front seat, Parker left Ms. Covington’s body in her car on 
a dirt road.166  Parker then caught a ride to a gas station and took a cab back 
home.167  Ms. Covington’s body was discovered by a passerby the following 
day.168 
An autopsy revealed that Ms. Covington had been hit by a stun gun and 
that her death resulted from drowning, not cardiac arrhythmia as Parker 
claimed during the investigation.169  At trial, the jury learned that three years 
prior to Ms. Covington’s death, Parker pled guilty to sixteen felony counts of ob-
taining property by false pretenses from an elderly woman for whom Parker 
provided care.170  The jury also learned that, prior to Ms. Covington’s murder, 
Parker obtained approximately $4,500 from Ms. Covington in order to pay resti-
tution for Parker’s previous crime and had attempted to obtain another $600 for 
the same purposes.171 
The jury found Parker guilty of both premeditated/deliberate murder and 
murder under the felony murder rule.172  The jury then found a single statutory 
aggravating factor—the murder of Ms. Covington was committed for pecuniary 
gain.173  As the North Carolina Supreme Court noted, after establishing a rela-
tionship with Ms. Covington through her role as a health care provider, Parker 
gained Ms. Covington’s trust, then kidnapped and eventually killed the elderly 
woman to steal money from her.174  In all, Parker took $7,000 from Ms. Coving-
ton, $4,500 of which she claimed was given to her by Ms. Covington for Parker’s 
doll-making business.175   
During their deliberations, the jury found only one statutory mitigating fac-
tor—the murder was committed while Parker was under the influence of mental 
or emotional disturbance.176  The jury additionally found two non-statutory 
mitigating factors present: (1) Parker’s mother died when Parker was 5 years 
old, an event which adversely affected Parker’s emotional development and (2) 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 891. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 892–93. 
 170. Id. at 893. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 895.  To be convicted under the felony murder rule in North Carolina, “an accused 
must be purposely resolved to commit the underlying crime in order to be held accountable for 
unlawful killing’s during the crimes’ commission.”  State v. Jones, 538 S.E. 2d 917, 924 (2000). 
 173. State v. Parker, 553 S.E.2d 885, 903 (N.C. 2001). 
 174. Id. at 904. 
 175. Id. at 891, 893. 
 176. Id. at 903–04. 
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Parker suffered from a mental defect and/or impairment.177  These mitigating 
factors, however, were outweighed by the malice and premeditation present in 
Parker’s crime, the pecuniary motive, and the fact that Parker kidnapped and 
drowned a “defenseless, elderly woman.”178  Parker’s sentence of death was thus 
upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court.179 
4. Christina Walters 
In October of 2001, a Cumberland County jury sentenced Christina Walters 
to death for the murder of two strangers.180  At trial, evidence was presented to 
show that Walters and eight other “Crips” gang members met up on August 16, 
1998.181  After determining that they needed money, the gang members decided 
to steal a car and drive it into a pawn shop window in order to steal the items 
from the pawn shop.182  After purchasing bullets from the local Wal-Mart, Wal-
ters instructed the other gang members to find and rob a victim, steal the vic-
tim’s car, put the victim in the trunk, and then return to Walters’ trailer.183  After 
providing these instructions, Walters left for her trailer.184  The gang members 
then spotted Debra Cheeseborough leaving a fast food restaurant at approxi-
mately 12:30 a.m. the next morning.  After abducting Cheeseborough at gun-
point, they put her in the trunk of her car and drove to Walters’ trailer.185 
Once the gang returned to Walters’ trailer, Walters and other gang mem-
bers drove Cheeseborough and her car out to a Fort Bragg lake.186  Walters or-
dered Cheeseborough to get down on one knee and attempted to shoot Cheese-
borough, but the gun jammed.187  After unjamming the gun, Walters shot 
Cheeseborough in the side, then fired an additional seven times.188  Cheesebor-
ough pretended to be dead and was discovered alive the next morning by a pas-
serby.189 
After leaving Cheeseborough for dead, the gang members returned to Wal-
ters’ trailer where they decided they needed a second car.190  After driving 
around for a while, Walters again ordered the other gang members to steal an-
other car; they targeted a car driven by Susan Moore, in which Tracy Lambert 
was a passenger.191  Walters handed another gang member a gun and left; the 
other gang members then forced Moore and Lambert into the trunk at gunpoint, 
 
 177. Id. at 904. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 905. 
 180. State v. Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344, 349–50 (N.C. 2003). 
 181. Id. at 349. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 350. 
 191. Id. 
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and drove to Walters’ trailer.192  At some point, the driver stopped the car and 
the gang members opened the trunk to rob the women of their jewelry.193 
After arriving at Walters’ trailer, the gang surrounded the car.194  As the 
women begged for mercy, the entire gang drove to another location and forced 
the women out of the trunk; the women were then executed by other gang 
members.195  Walters was found guilty of the following: two counts each of first-
degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon; 
one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
first-degree kidnapping and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous 
weapon.  In a second indictment, Walters was additionally charged with and 
found guilty of attempted first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first de-
gree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious 
injury, first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon.196 
During sentencing, the jury found four aggravating factors in support of 
Walters’ sentence of death: (1) the murders were committed while Walters was 
engaged in a capital felony, (2) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain, 
(3) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and (4) the murders 
were part of a course of conduct which included the commission of other crimes 
of violence against other persons.197 
On mandatory appeal, the Supreme Court found ample evidence to sup-
port the jury’s finding of the four aggravating factors.198  First, the Court found 
that Walters was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder under both the 
felony murder rule for kidnapping and robbery with a firearm and murder with 
premeditation and deliberation.199  Second, the murder of the two victims was 
committed for pecuniary gain—not only did the gang members rob the women 
of their jewelry, but their ultimate goal was to use the stolen automobile to rob a 
pawn shop.200  Third, the Court found that the murders were especially heinous 
and cruel201 given the following sequence of events: the two women were forced 
into the trunk at gunpoint; they attempted in vain to escape; they were driven 
around for an hour while begging for help and asking not to be hurt; they had 
their jewelry stolen; and they were forced to plead for their lives before they 
were shot to death.202  Additionally, as another gang member held a knife to her 
throat, Moore was forced to watch as Lambert was shot in the head.203  Finally, 
Walters’ murder of the two women was part of a “course of conduct in which 
[Walters] engaged and which included the commission by [Walters] of other 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 349. 
 197. Id. at 370. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. at 370–71. 
 200. See id. at 370, 349–50. 
 201. Id. at 362. 
 202. Id. at 362–63. 
 203. Id. at 363. 
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crimes of violence against other persons.”204  Prior to the two women’s murder, 
Walters had previously instructed members of her gang to steal Ms. Cheesebor-
ough’s car and had personally shot Ms. Cheeseborough eight times, leaving her 
for dead.205  After finding that Walters’ death sentence was not imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,206 the Supreme 
Court found no error in Walters’ death sentence.207 
C. Common Factors 
Taken together, the four women were sentenced to death on the basis of the 
following aggravating factors: (1) murder during the commission of a capital 
felony, (2) murder for pecuniary gain, (3) murder that was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel and (4) murder during the commission of other crimes of vio-
lence against others 208  The single aggravating factor present in all four cases 
was that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain.209 
The next section of this note will summarize the cases of the thirty-two men 
sentenced to death after 1990210 who are either currently on North Carolina’s 
death row or have been executed by the State of North Carolina.  These men 
have been selected for two reasons: (1) they were convicted by juries from the 
same counties as the four women and (2) each man was sentenced to death un-
der at least one of the common aggravating factors involved in the women’s sen-
tences.   
D. The Men of North Carolina’s Death Row 
As noted above, since 1990 the counties that sentenced the four women to 
death have sent thirty-two men to North Carolina’s death row based on a find-
ing of at least one aggravating factor shared with one of the four women listed 
above.211  These men either currently await death on North Carolina’s death row 
or have been executed by the state. 
Of these thiry-two men, the jury found commission of murder during the 
course of a felony as an aggravating factor in twenty-two cases.  In nineteen 
cases, the jury handed down the death penalty in part because the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Four men were sentenced in part for 
commission of a murder for pecuniary gain, and thirteen men were found to 
have committed their murders during the course of a crime spree.  In terms of 
mitigating circumstances, the jury found that eleven of the men were mentally 
or emotionally disturbed at the time of their crimes, and ten men lacked the ca-
 
 204. Id. at 370. 
 205. Id. at 349–50. 
 206. Id. at 370. 
 207. Id. at 371. 
 208. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; Jennings, 
430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Jennings and Moore were sentenced to death in November 1990, therefore the men chosen 
for this analysis were sentenced after this date. 
211
 This number is current as of M arch 2004. 
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pacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct at the time of their crimes.  
The age of three of the men was found to be mitigating factors in their cases, and 
a lack of a significant history of prior criminal acts was found in the cases of 
three others.  Another three men were found to have other mitigating circum-
stances.212 
The crimes of six of the men on death row are described below.  These 
men’s stories are discussed to give the reader a sense of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors that have been applied by juries to the capital sentencing of 
males.  Despite this small sampling, it must be noted that the analysis in the fol-
lowing section is performed using the circumstances of all thirty-two men who 
meet the enumerated criteria. 
Elmer McNeill, Jr. was sentenced to death by a Wake County jury in April 
1996 for the first-degree murders of Robert Truelove and John David Ray.213  Po-
lice found the bodies of both men and approximately $2,300 missing from the 
grocery store where the two worked.214  The police found a palm print belonging 
to McNeill on the rear door of the grocery store, and the defendant’s brother, an 
employee of the grocery store, later admitted that the defendant confessed to 
murdering both men.215  The jury found three aggravating circumstances, two of 
which were that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and that the 
murder was part of the defendant’s course of conduct which included commis-
sion of crimes of violence against another person or persons.216   
Russell Tucker was sentenced to death by a Forsyth County jury in Febru-
ary of 1996 for the murder of Maurice Williams.217  After walking out of a K-Mart 
wearing stolen merchandise, Tucker was stopped by Mr. Williams, a security 
guard, and two other K-Mart employees.218  Tucker pulled out a gun, fired, 
missed, fired again, and killed Mr. Williams.219  The jury found a total of four ag-
gravating circumstances including: (1) Tucker committed the robbery for pecu-
niary gain and (2) Mr. Williams’ murder was part of a course of the defendant’s 
conduct which included the commission of crimes against others.220   
Leroy Mann was sentenced to death by a Wake County jury in July 1997 for 
the death of Janet Houser.221  Ms. Houser was a co-worker of Mann’s; the day be-
fore her death, she notified him that he had been laid off from his job at Ad-
vanced Plastics, Inc. and need not report to work the following day.222  The fol-
lowing day, Mann asked Ms. Houser to lunch to discuss his unemployment 
 
 212. Please see Appendix for a listing of all 32 men and the aggravating factors under which they 
were convicted. 
 213. State v. McNeill, 509 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1998). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 419. 
 216. Id. at 427.  The jury found that the murders were committed by McNeill to eliminate wit-
nesses to the robbery and avoid arrest.  The North Carolina Supreme Court found that this aggravat-
ing circumstance alone was enough to uphold the death sentence.  Id. at 427–428. 
 217. State v. Tucker, 490 S.E.2d 559, 560 (N.C. 1997). 
 218. Id. at 561. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 564–65. 
 221. State v. Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776, 779 (N.C. 2002). 
 222. Id. at 780. 
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benefits, and the two agreed to meet across the street from Mann’s apartment 
complex.223  Ms. Houser’s husband reported her missing later that day when she 
failed to return home.224  Ms. Houser’s body was found two days after her lunch 
appointment with a gunshot wound to the chest and several bruises and lacera-
tions.225  Investigation of Mann’s apartment showed blood spatter covered by 
new paint and Mann’s car was found to contain a 9mm pistol and cleaning 
items.226  The jury convicted Mann of first-degree murder under the felony mur-
der rule and found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was com-
mitted during the commission of a robbery, (2) the murder was committed for 
pecuniary gain, and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.227  
No statutory mitigating factors were found.228 
Timothy White was sentenced by a Forsyth County jury to death in August 
2000 for the murder of his elderly great-aunt.229  White had taken four guns from 
his father’s gun cabinet to play with when he put a .22-caliber handgun in his 
back pocket and walked next door.230  When his aunt opened the door, White 
shot her in the chest.231  He stomped on her head “until he thought she was 
dead,”232  then took $100 from her wallet and drove to West Virginia in her 
Cadillac.233  The jury found three aggravating circumstances present, including 
that the murder was committed during the commission of robbery with a fire-
arm and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.234  Though the jury 
found three statutory mitigating factors present—(1) the murder was committed 
while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional distur-
bance, (2) the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
was impaired, and (3) the defendant was a young age at the time of the mur-
der—the mitigating factors were found insufficient to outweigh the aggravating 
factors.235 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Due to the small sample size of women on death row in North Carolina, it 
may appear difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the gender differences 
in capital sentencing.  However, the fact that there are only a small number of 
women available for analysis lies at the very heart of this issue.  The theoretical 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 780–81. 
 226. Id. at 781.  It was later determined that the pistol found in Mrs. Mann’s car was the one that 
that killed Ms. Hauser and Ms. Hauser’s prints were found inside the trunk of Mrs. Mann’s car.  Id. 
 227. Id. at 790. 
 228. Id. 
 229. State v. White, 565 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. 2002). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 68. 
 235. Id. at 68–69; see id. at 58. 
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explanations presented in the first section of this note remain applicable in ex-
plaining the gender discrepancies for death sentences in North Carolina. 
A. Gender-Biased Aggravating Factors? 
Prior to analyzing whether the aggravating factors considered by North 
Carolina juries in death-eligible cases are gender-biased, it should be noted that 
none of the variables in the following analysis have been controlled.  The four 
women whose cases have been analyzed above were chosen simply because 
they currently await their death.236  The men’s cases were chosen for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) they have been sentenced to death by a North Carolina jury after 
November 5, 1990—the date of Patricia Jennings’ death sentence, (2) each man 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after a finding of one or more 
of the same aggravating factors found in each of the women’s sentences, and (3) 
the men were sentenced in the same counties as the women. 
1. Murder for Economic Gain 
Consistent with Rapaport’s conclusion that women who murder for eco-
nomic gain are more likely to be sentenced to death than women who murder 
for other reasons,237 every woman currently on death row in North Carolina 
committed murder, at least in part, for the purposes of financial gain.238  Evi-
dence was presented that Jennings managed to acquire nearly $170,000 from her 
elderly husband before murdering him.239  Moore stood to gain nearly $45,000 as 
a beneficiary of her boyfriend’s insurance and one-third of his estate; she had 
additionally received $10,000 from her boyfriend prior to poisoning him.240  It is 
unknown how much Walters gained as a result of the murder of her two vic-
tims; the amount did, however, include a car and the victims’ jewelry.241  Parker 
was found to have taken nearly $7000 from her elderly victim both before and 
during the kidnapping.242 
Of the four women, only Parker’s sentence was based on the sole aggravat-
ing factor of murder for pecuniary gain.243  Jennings, Moore, and Walters were 
each additionally found to have committed murders that were “especially hei-
nous, atrocious, and cruel.”244  Jennings and Walters were also found to have 
 
 236. The four women were sentenced to death on the basis of the following four aggravating fac-
tors: (i) murder  committed during a capital felony; (ii)  murder  committed for pecuniary or finan-
cial gain; (iii)  murder that was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (iv)  murder  committed 
during the commission of violent crimes against another person.  The single factor common to all 
four sentences was murder committed for financial gain.  See Walters, 588 S.E.2d. 344; Parker, 553 
S.E.2d 885; Moore, 440 S.E.2d. 797; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 188. 
 237. Gender Gap Argument, supra note 40, at 226. 
 238. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344; Parker, 553 S.E.2d 885; Moore, 440 S.E.2d. 797; Jennings, 430 
S.E.2d 188. 
 239. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 210–11. 
 240. Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 822. 
 241. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 349–50. 
 242. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 891, 893. 
 243. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; Jennings, 
430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 244. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
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committed murder during the commission of a felony.245  Finally, Walters was 
convicted on a fourth aggravating factor—murder that occurred during the 
commission of other crimes of violence.246 
Given the aggravating factors noted above, it appears that the aggravating 
factors were not applied in a discriminatory fashion against the women on 
death row.  First, regarding the pecuniary gain factor, in Jennings’s, Moore’s, 
and Walter’s cases, each woman stood to gain a significant financial amount for 
her act(s) of murder247 and attempted to achieve that gain by committing a mur-
der that was so heinous and cruel that their victims were forced to suffer either 
prolonged physical or psychological agony.248  It would thus appear that these 
women were sentenced based on both the magnitude of their anticipated finan-
cial gain and the methods they employed. 
Superficially, it would appear that the pecuniary gain factor has rarely been 
applied to men.  Of the thirty-two men listed above, only four, or thirteen per-
cent, were sentenced to death upon a finding, in part, that they committed mur-
der for financial gain.249  However, upon closer analysis and comparison to the 
three women who were sentenced at least in part for murder for pecuniary gain, 
one could plausibly argue that the men listed above were convicted on the basis 
of much lesser pecuniary gain than their female counterparts.  Timothy White 
was sentenced to death for shooting his great-aunt in the chest, stomping on her 
body until he thought she was dead, then taking $100 and her Cadillac as he es-
caped.250  Leroy Mann murdered his co-worker after she notified him that he had 
been fired, forcing her to help him withdraw approximately $300 from her bank 
account prior to her death.251  Russell Tucker murdered a K-Mart security guard 
after he was stopped for wearing stolen merchandise out of the store.252  Elmer 
McNeill, Jr. murdered two grocery store employees after stealing $2300 from the 
store safe.253  Thus, when comparing the amount each man stood to gain from 
their crimes and the methods employed to further that gain, the men’s spoils 
paled in comparison to that of the women.254  Of the three women found to have 
committed both murder for pecuniary gain and at least one other statutory ag-
gravating factor, each stood to gain at least ten times Tucker’s or Mann’s pro-
jected spoils.255 
Further, unlike Carlette Parker, none of the men were sentenced to death 
 
 245. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 246. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370. 
 247. See supra notes 121, 148, and 197. 
 248. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 362–63; Moore, 440 S.E. 2d at 823; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 213, 206. 
 249. See White, 565 S.E.2d 55; Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776; McNeill, 509 S.E.2d 415; Tucker, 490 S.E.2d 
559. 
 250. See White, 565 S.E.2d 55 at 68. 
 251. See Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776 at 790. 
 252. See Tucker, 490 S.E.2d 559 at 564. 
 253. See  McNeill, 509 S.E.2d 415 at 427. 
 254. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 349–50; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 891, 893; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 822; 
Jennings, 430, S.E.2d at 210–11. 
 255. See Mann, 560 S.E.2d at 779–80; Tucker, 490 S.E.2d at 561. This is assuming that the amount 
Tucker was able to walk out of the K-Mart wearing could not have been more than the $300 Mann 
stole from his co-worker. 
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based on the sole aggravating factor of murder for pecuniary gain.256  Mann was 
found to have committed a murder that was “especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel” during the course of a felony.257  Of the other three, McNeill’s and 
Tucker’s financial gain occurred during the course of a crime spree,258 and 
White’s gain occurred during robbery with a firearm.259 
As noted above, only Carlette Parker was sentenced to death based solely 
on the finding of murder for pecuniary gain as the aggravating circumstance.260  
Her situation has been excluded from the above analysis because she appears to 
have been sentenced based solely under the “evil woman” theory.261  Parker is a 
woman who completely violated her role as a home health care provider for the 
elderly when she took advantage of that position and approached Ms. Coving-
ton, the elderly friend of Parker’s former charge.  Not only did Parker force Ms. 
Covington to withdraw $2500 from her bank account, but she had taken an ad-
ditional $4500 from the victim earlier in order to pay restitution to another eld-
erly victim.262  Further, after Parker murdered Ms. Covington, she showed com-
plete disregard for Ms. Covington’s body.263  The jury’s decision to give Parker 
the death penalty was likely influenced by how egregiously she violated soci-
ety’s gender-based expectation, given that Parker’s death sentence is based on a 
single aggravating factor.  Even the North Carolina Supreme Court, at Parker’s 
appeal, noted that Parker had taken advantage of her role as a home-health care 
provider to extract money from Ms. Covington.264 
Parker’s situation aside, after taking into consideration the comparison of 
situations in which men and women were convicted under pecuniary gain, it 
appears that men who commit other crimes for which they stand to gain eco-
nomically are sentenced to death for a much smaller economic gain than 
women.  Given the prominence that the chivalry and “evil woman” theories 
play in the sentencing of females to death, the most likely conclusion from the 
above cases is that, if a woman and commits murder in part for economic gain, 
she must stand to gain quite a lot to have this factored into her death sentence; if 
a man is convicted in part for a murder involving economic gain, the slightest 
amount will put the proverbial “nail in the coffin.”265  This, however, is not the 
only conclusion that may be drawn, just the most obvious given the prevailing 
theories. 
 
 256. See  White, 565 S.E.2d at 68; Mann, 560 S.E.2d at 790; McNeill, 509 S.E.2d at 427; Tucker, 490 
S.E.2d at 564. 
 257. Mann, 560 S.E.2d at 790. 
 258. Tucker, 490 S.E.2d at 564; McNeill, 509 S.E.2d at 427. 
 259. White, 565 S.E.2d at 68. 
 260. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 895. 
 261. Questions about Gender, supra note 22, at 513. 
 262. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 890, 893. 
 263. Id. at 890–91. 
 264. Id. at 904. 
 265. It must be noted that other conclusions may be drawn from these results.  A better compari-
son might lie in determining how many women were convicted of taking amounts comparable to 
the amounts of the men studied above to determine how their sentences were affected.  Since 
women who took comparable amounts to that of the men are NOT to be found on death row, the 
conclusions drawn here seemed the most obvious. 
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2. Murder Committed During a Felony 
It would appear that the aggravating factor of murder committed during 
the course of a felony was not used disproportionately in the women’s sentenc-
ing decisions.  As noted above, two out of the four women were sentenced to 
death in part for committing murder during the course of a felony.266  Of the 
men, seventeen, or fifty-five percent, were sentenced to death based on a finding 
of murder committed during a felony and at least one other aggravating fac-
tor.267  In other words, roughly the same percentage of women and men on death 
row were sentenced to death in part for murder during the commission of a fel-
ony. 
However, when analyzing the use of murder during the course of a felony 
as an aggravating factor in men’s sentencing, it might appear, using the men’s 
population as a point of comparison, that juries have applied this factor un-
equally in favor of women.  Of the thirty-two men, five were sentenced to death 
based solely on murder committed during a felony.268  One would expect a com-
parable percentage, approximately sixteen percent, of women who commit 
“manly” crimes to have been sentenced to death on this factor alone.  However, 
no women in the North Carolina population studied were sentenced to death 
based on murder committed during a felony alone.269 
The application of the chivalry theory might explain such disproportional-
ity—society sentences women to death based on the same aggravating factors 
under which men are sentenced.  Thus, when society contemplates sentencing a 
woman to death for murder committed during a felony, it must do so under a 
scheme designed with men in mind.  As a result, society must compare a 
woman in the same situation to that of a man.  But, as has been revealed by the 
chivalry theory, society has an inherent desire to protect women and therefore 
requires much more to sentence women to death.  Thus, women who commit a 
crime which would normally subject a significant proportion of their male coun-
terparts to death are, at least in the case of North Carolina, highly unlikely to be 
sentenced to death.270  Given the proffered data, it would appear that society has 
determined that women convicted solely on the basis of murder during a felony 
are more amenable to rehabilitation than men in the same situation. 
Under this particular aggravating factor, the merging of the chivalry and 
“evil woman” theories is evidenced by the fact that, in the felony murder cases 
 
 266. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 267. See State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 659–60 (N.C. 2002); White, 565 S.E.2d at 68; Mann, 560 
S.E.2d at 790; State v. Fair, 557 S.E.2d 500, 527 (N.C. 2001); State v. Meyer, 540 S.E.2d 1, 16 (N.C. 
2000); State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 246 (N.C. 2000); State v. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d 486, 511 (N.C. 
1999); State v. Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d 622, 644 (N.C. 1999); State v. Moses, 517 S.E.2d 853, 873 
(N.C. 1999); State v. Frogge, 528 S.E.2d 893, 900 (N.C. 1999); McNeill, 509 S.E.2d at 427; State v. 
Woods, 480 S.E.2d 647, 658 (N.C. 1997); State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 398; State v. Leary, 472 
S.E.2d 753, 760 (N.C. 1996); State v. Robinson, 463 S.E.2d 218, 225 (N.C. 1995); State v. Moseley, 445 
S.E.2d 906, 915 (N.C. 1994); and State v. Sexton, 444 S.E.2d 879, 906 (N.C. 1994). 
 268. See State v. Robinson, 561 S.E.2d 245, 260 (N.C. 2001); State v. Cagle, 488 S.E.2d 535, 545 
(N.C. 1997); State v. E. McNeill, 485 S.E.2d 284, 289 (N.C. 1997); State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d 907, 920 
(N.C. 1997); State v. Thomas, 477 S.E.2d 450, 460 (N.C. 1996). 
 269. See supra notes 121, 148, 173, and 197. 
 270. See supra C1 and C2. 
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analyzed above, only Jennings was found to have a mitigating circumstance af-
fecting her sentence, that of no prior record.271  Yet, of the seventeen men sen-
tenced in part under the felony murder rule, the jury found mitigating factors in 
the case of twelve: six were found to have their capacity to appreciate criminal-
ity impaired,272 three were under the age of twenty-one,273 three were emotionally 
disturbed at the time of the murder,274 one had no prior record,275 and two were 
found to have other mitigating circumstances.276  Of these twelve, nine were 
found to have factors which affected their mental state at the time of the crime.277  
Given this data, it would appear that the chivalry and “evil woman” theories 
played a large role in Jennings’ and Walters’ sentences: they committed crimes 
for which society was unable to find factors that would mitigate their crimes and 
bring them back under society’s protection.  As for the nine men whose mental 
states were in question at the time of their crimes, the jury disregarded that fac-
tor and continued to uphold the theory that men who kill must be sentenced to 
death, regardless of mitigating circumstances.278 
3. Murder that is Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel 
Findings that a capitol felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
appear to have been applied in a gender-neutral fashion.  As noted above, three 
of the four women were found to have committed murder that was “especially 
heinous, atrocious or cruel.”279  Of the men, seventeen of the thirty-one were 
found to have committed an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” murder.280  
Only four, though, were sentenced to death based solely on this factor.281  Put-
ting aside the offender’s gender in each case, each murder that the jury found to 
be “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” thoroughly and completely shocks 
the conscious.  It must be noted, however, that the author does not know how 
many women committed murders that were “especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel,” yet escaped the death penalty based on mitigating factors. 
 
 271. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 272. Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 660; White, 565 S.E.2d at 68–69; Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; 
Larry, 481S.E.2d at 913; Woods, 480 S.E.2d, at 658–59; Thomas, 477 S.E.2d at 458. 
 273. White, 565 S.E.2d at 68–69; Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 246. 
 274. White, 565 S.E.2d at 68–69; Robinson, 463 S.E.2d at 227; L. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d at 511. 
 275. Meyer, 540 S.E.2d at 17. 
 276. Fair, 557 S.E.2d at 526–27; L. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d at 511. 
 277. Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 660; White, 565 S.E.2d at 68–69; Robinson, 463 S.E.2d at 227; Golphin, 
533 S.E.2d at 246; L. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d at 511; Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; Larry, 481S.E.2d at 
913; Woods, 480 S.E.2d, at 658–59; and Thomas, 477 S.E.2d at 458. 
 278. See infra Part B(1). 
 279. Supra notes 121, 148, 197. 
 280. See State v. Carroll, 573 S.E.2d 899, 916 (N.C. 2002); Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 659–60; Mann, 
560 S.E.2d at 790; Fair, 557 S.E.2d at 527; State v. Hooks, 548 S.E.2d 501, 506 (N.C. 2001); Robinson, 
463 S.E.2d at 225; State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 23 (N.C. 2000); Meyer, 540 S.E.2d at 16; Golphin, 
533 S.E.2d at 246; State v. Thibodeaux, 532 S.E.2d 797, 807 (N.C. 2000); McNeil, 518 S.E.2d at 511; 
Frogge, 528 S.E.2d at 900; State v. Flippen, 506 S.E.2d 702, 705 (N.C. 1998); Woods, 480 S.E.2d at 658; 
Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d at 398; Moseley, 445 S.E.2d at 915; and Sexton, 444 S.E.2d at 906 . 
 281. Hooks, 548 S.E.2d at 506; Holman, 540 S.E.2d at 23; Thibodeaux, 532 S.E.2d at 807; and 
Flippen, 506 S.E.2d at 705. 
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4. Murder Committed During Crime Spree 
According to the statistics of the given time period, in North Carolina only 
one woman, Walters, was sentenced, in part based on a finding of murder com-
mitted during the commission of a crime spree,282 while one man was sentenced 
to death based solely on a crime spree283 and twelve other men were sentenced to 
death based in part on murder committed during a crime spree.284  Given these 
facts, one might surmise that juries are highly unlikely to sentence women to 
death for murder committed during crime sprees alone, unless they violate so-
cietal stereotypes. 
It is also interesting to note the impact mitigating factors under this factor 
for both men and women.  Though it is unknown how many women committed 
murders as part of a crime spree yet escaped death as a result of a finding of 
mitigating factors, of the thirteen men sentenced under as a result of their crime 
sprees, seven were found to have mitigating factors present.285 Moreover, of 
those seven men, four were determined to have been suffering from some com-
bination of having been under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance 
and of an inability to appreciate the criminality of their conduct.286  What ex-
plains this discrepancy?  Though we only have one woman from which to draw 
a conclusion, the answer most likely lies in the application of the chivalry theory 
when women are convicted of murders during crime sprees.  If the jury is able 
to find at least one mitigating factor that can spare that woman death, they will 
do so.  The same cannot be said for men who committed crime sprees.  Substan-
tial mitigating factors were present in a number of the analyzed cases, yet each 
man was sentenced to death.287 
5. Mitigating Factors 
When determining three out of the four women’s sentences, juries did not 
find that there were any statutory mitigating factors related to their mental 
states.288  In the case of fourteen men who were sentenced to death in North 
Carolina since 1990, juries did examine statutory mitigating factors related to the 
mental state of the perpetrator at the time of the murder,289 but decided these fac-
 
 282. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370. 
 283. State v. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d 109, 153–54 (N.C. 2002). 
 284. Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 659-60; State v. Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d 830, 843 (N.C. 2001); Meyer, 540 
S.E.2d at 16; Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 246; Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; Moses, 517 S.E.2d at 873; 
Frogge, 528 S.E.2d at 900; McNeill, 509 S.E.2d at 427; Tucker, 490 S.E.2d at 564; State v. Page, 488 
S.E.2d 225, 299 (N.C. 1997); Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d at 398; and Leary, 472 S.E.2d at 760. 
 285. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d at 153–54; Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d at 843; Meyer, 540 S.E.2d at 16; Mor-
ganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; and Page, 488 S.E.2d at 299. 
 286. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d at 153; Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d at 843; Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; 
Page, 488 S.E.2d at 299. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 344; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903–04; and Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 825. It 
should be noted that the jury in Jennings’ case found as a statutory mitigating factor that she had no 
significant history of prior criminal conduct.  Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 289. See Carroll, 573 S.E.2d at 916; White, 565 S.E.2d at 68–69; Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 660; Nichol-
son, 558 S.E.2d at 153–54; Fair, 557 S.E.2d at 526–27; Hooks, 548 S.E.2d at 511–12; Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d 
at 843; Robinson, 561 S.E.2d at 260; Holman, 540 S.E.2d at 26; Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 246; McNeil, 518 
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tors were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors present.290  Of all those 
men and women analyzed above, only Jennings, Flippen, and Meyer were 
found to have no significant history of prior criminal conduct.291  Each however 
was found to have committed an “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” mur-
der.292  It would thus appear that neither of the two men was treated any differ-
ently than Jennings. 
6. Conclusions Regarding Application of Aggravating Factors 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the aggravating factors enumer-
ated by the state disproportionally sentence men to death while their female 
counterparts receive a lesser sentence.  One would expect at least some dispro-
portionality given that the aggravating factors considered by are based on what 
society believes aggravates murder committed by men. 293  However, when this 
inherent bias in the system is taken together with society’s disinclination to sen-
tence women to die, fewer and fewer women are sentenced under this scheme 
while more and more men await their deaths. 
The cases analyzed above illustrate this disturbing reality.  When a murder 
is committed in part for pecuniary gain, it appears that it takes a much less sig-
nificant pecuniary gain to sentence a man under this factor than to sentence a 
woman.294  Additionally, the proportion of both men and women sentenced in 
part under a finding of murder committed during a felony is roughly equal.  
However, a significant number of men were sentenced to death despite having 
obvious mitigating factors related to their mental and emotional states at the 
time of their crimes,295 whereas Parker was the only woman to be sentenced to 
death despite a mitigating factor related to her mental state at the time of the 
murder.296  Further, of the crime sprees committed by men, a majority were 
found to have some mitigating factor present that affected their crimes, yet were 
still sentenced to death.297  Only one woman was convicted in part due to her 
participation in a crime spree and the jury was unable to find any redeeming 
qualities in order to “save her” from the death penalty.298  In short, when a man 
commits a murder, it appears to take relatively little for a jury to sentence him to 
death.  When a woman commits murder, she must violate, and violate egre-
 
S.E.2d at 511; Morganherring,  517 S.E.2d at 643–44; Page, 488 S.E.2d at 229; Larry, 481 S.E.2d at 913; 
Woods, 480 S.E.2d at 659; Thomas, 477 S.E.2d at 458. 
 290. N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000(a)(1)(2004). 
 291. Meyer, 540 S.E.2d at 17; Flippen, 506 S.E.2d at 705; and Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See infra Part B(1); see also Domestic Discount, supra note 63, at 1515–17. 
 294. Supra notes 250-254. 
 295. See Carroll, 573 S.E.2d at 916; White, 565 S.E.2d at 58, 68–69 ; Williams, 565 S.E.2d at 660; 
Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d at 153; Fair, 557 S.E.2d at 527; Hooks, 548 S.E.2d at 511–12; Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d 
at 843; Robinson, 561 S.E.2d at 260; Holman, 540 S.E.2d at 26; Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 246; McNeil, 518 
S.E.2d at 491; Morganherring,  517 S.E.2d at 643–44; Page, 488 S.E.2d at 229; Larry, 481 S.E.2d at 913; 
Woods, 480 S.E.2d at 659; and Thomas, 477 S.E.2d at 460. 
 296. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903-04; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 806, 822; and 
Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 297. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d at 153–54; Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d at 843; Meyer, 540 S.E.2d at 16; 
Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d at 644; and Page, 488 S.E.2d at 299. 
 298. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370. 
080305 REZA.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
208 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 12:179 2005 
giously, society’s gender stereotypes in order to be put to death; otherwise, soci-
ety’s chivalrous nature will find a way to spare her from the ultimate penalty. 
B. A Better Explanation 
If the aggravating and mitigating factors present in North Carolina’s statu-
tory scheme tend to favor preventing the imposition of death for female murder-
ers,299 what explains the presence of these four women on death row?  After re-
viewing the mandatory appeals of the four women300 and thirty-two men,301 these 
women’s presence on death row can most easily be explained by the gender 
theories noted above.302  In fact, these four women’s sentences are entirely con-
sistent with Rapaport’s conclusions regarding the sentencing of women on 
death row303 and the “evil woman” theory.304 
As a result of her research,  Rapaport concluded that there are three types 
of murder heinous enough to require a jury or other sentencing authority to sen-
tence a woman to death; they are “murder for gain or advantage,” “murder in 
the course of resisting law enforcement,” and murder involving exceptional cru-
elty or multiple victims.305  Rapaport’s conclusion appears to explain why the 
four women on North Carolina’s death row were sentenced to death.  All four 
women were found guilty of having committed murder for pecuniary gain.306  
Walters, in addition to committing murder for financial gain, also was involved 
in the murder of multiple victims.307  Moore was suspected of having murdered 
her first husband and her father and was convicted of the murder of her boy-
friend, for which she was sentenced to death.308  Further, Jennings, Moore and 
Walters were all found to have committed “especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel” murders.309 
Professor Rapaport has additionally concluded that three of the most influ-
ential factors involved in sentencing a woman to death are the following: (1) her 
prior criminal records, (2) the seriousness of her offense, and (3) her degree of 
culpability.310  Again, such a conclusion would explain the presence of all four 
women on death row.  In three of the four cases, the defendant committed the 
murders by her own hand;311 Walters, on the other hand, ordered other members 
 
 299. See infra Part E. 
 300. See infra Part D. 
 301. See infra Part D. 
 302. See infra Parts A and B. 
 303. See infra Part C. 
 304. See infra Part B. 
 305. The Gender Gap Argument, supra note 41, at 226. 
 306. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 891, 893; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 822; and 
Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 208.  Each jury found present as an aggravating factor that the murder was 
committed for pecuniary gain, N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-2000(e)(6). 
 307. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370. 
 308. Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 802. 
 309. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; and Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 310. Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, supra note 69, at 372. 
 311. See Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 890; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 804–805, 823; and Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 
193. 
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of her gang to shoot her two victims.312  Additionally, of the four women, only 
Jennings had no prior criminal record;313  Moore was convicted under suspicion 
that she had poisoned her first husband, her second husband, and her father;314 
Parker had a prior conviction for forging checks;315 and evidence was submitted 
at Walters’ trial that she had previously stabbed a boyfriend with a box cutter.316  
And in terms of the seriousness of their offenses, three of the four women were 
sentenced after a finding of multiple aggravating factors.317 
Further, the murders committed by Jennings and Moore fit squarely within 
Rapaport’s distinction of murder as an “economic crime with intimate vic-
tims.”318  Jennings murdered her elderly husband after he transferred $150,000 to 
her and she subsequently consistently and almost completely depleted her hus-
band’s individual account by obtaining his power of attorney.319  After obtaining 
her boyfriend’s power of attorney and convincing him to include her in his will 
and designation as the beneficiary of his insurance policy, Moore slowly poi-
soned her boyfriend to death.320  The purpose of these two murders was pure fi-
nancial gain and the targets were an unsuspecting and trusting husband and 
boyfriend. 
Moreover, when Rapaport’s categorizations and distinctions are coupled 
with the “evil woman” theory and the chivalrous inclinations of society, it is no 
surprise that a jury sentenced these women to death.  In three of the four cases—
Jennings, Moore, and Parker—the women who killed were sentenced to death 
not simply for the heinousness of their crimes, but because they rejected the 
stereotype of the “gentler sex.”321  Both Jennings and Parker were health care 
providers for the elderly who violated the implicit trust society places in health 
care providers and took advantage of elderly victims.322  On appeal, even the 
members of the North Carolina Supreme Court fell victim to their chivalrous in-
clinations when they commented that Parker had taken advantage of her role as 
a home health care provider to extract money from Ms. Covington.323 Addition-
ally, Jennings and Moore violated the trust held between spouses/intimates by 
murdering their partners in a cold, premeditated, and cruel manner.324  The 
murder committed by Walters was most definitely “unladylike”325—she ordered 
two men to murder their victims after she determined, twice, the victim from 
whom her gang should steal a car.326  Moreover, three of the four women, 
 
 312. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 349–50. 
 313. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 314. Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 802. 
 315. Parker, 553, S.E.2d at 893. 
 316. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 353. 
 317. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; and Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206;;. 
 318. Domestic Discount, supra note 632, at 1519. 
 319. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 211. 
 320. Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 806, 803–806. 
 321. See Dreifus, supra note 521. 
 322. See Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 890; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 589–90. 
 323. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 904. 
 324. See Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 803–05; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 590–91. 
 325. See Unequal Before the Law, supra note 398, at 459. 
 326. Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 349–50. 
080305 REZA.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
210 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 12:179 2005 
Jennings, Parker, and Moore had no co-defendants; 327 there was thus no male 
co-defendant to whom the jury could attribute the woman’s submission.328  And 
perhaps most importantly, each of the four women killed for relatively signifi-
cant pecuniary gain.329 
It is also important to note that, of the four women, only Parker was found 
to have been mentally or emotionally disturbed at the time she committed mur-
der.330  However, given the gravity and heinousness of her crime, it was impos-
sible for the jury to find such a factor outweighed the need to sentence her to 
death.  And for the other three women, for whom no mitigating factors were 
found to have impaired their emotional state or their capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of their conduct, it must have been incredibly easy for their juries to 
sentence these women to death.331  These women no longer deserved society’s 
protection; society could find no redeeming factors that would allow these 
women to be drawn back into society’s arms as women who needed to be pro-
tected or shielded.  These women committed cold and violent crimes much like 
men and therefore deserved to be treated like men. 
Again, the most likely conclusion that can be drawn from these women’s 
presence on death row is that they “stepped outside the bounds of normative 
femininity”332 and no longer conformed to society’s gender stereotypes.333 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the sentences of the four women and comparing their sentences 
to that of the surveyed shows that these women’s presence on death row can be 
explained most easily under the auspices of gender theories.  Given this conclu-
sion, it appears that the Supreme Court’s goal in Furman and its progeny to re-
move the selective and arbitrary application of the death penalty has failed.  
Though every state and the federal government now have a facially non-
discriminatory sentencing scheme, this scheme remains decidedly balanced in 
favor of keeping women off death row, despite the heinousness of their crimes.  
Men, on the other hand, appear to suffer disproportionately at the hand of these 
schemes.334 
What can be done to remedy this disproportionate application of the death 
penalty?  Given society’s overwhelming chivalrous inclinations and the fact that 
aggravating factors are based on how men are more likely kill, it would seem 
highly improbable that procedural change would result in a more balanced ap-
 
 327. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 890–92; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 802–05; Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 191–94.  I 
have not counted Walters as acting alone because two others actually pulled the trigger for the mur-
ders.  I am presuming that those men were also tried in criminal court for their roles. 
 328. See Gendering the Death Penalty, supra note 10, at 462–63; Death Penalty for Females, supra note 
376, at 878. 
 329. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 824; and 
Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 330. Parker, 553 S.E.2d at 903–04. 
 331. See Walters, 588 S.E.2d at 370; Moore, 440 S.E.2d at 806; and Jennings, 430 S.E.2d at 206. 
 332. Unequal Before the Law, supra note 38, at 459. 
 333. The Gender Gap Argument, supra note 40 at 218. 
 334. See infra Parts C and D. 
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plication of the death penalty across gender lines, unless it involved amending 
statutory aggravating factors to include conduct such as the murder of inti-
mates.  The most obvious, and most difficult, remedy would be to change soci-
ety’s chivalrous attitude to reflect a more balanced view regarding those who 
commit murder.  This, of course, will be extremely difficult to do, given the his-
tory and overwhelming prevalence of a “disinclination to sentence women to 
die.”335 
One solution might be to require jury instructions that the defendant’s 
gender cannot play any role in their determination of aggravation or mitigation.  
Another solution might be to allow only judges to determine sentencing.  Such a 
solution, however, still cannot insure that a judge’s inherent disinclination to 
sentence women to death will not interfere.  The most fair and gender-blind so-
lution would be to have a separate jury, which is not told the defendant’s gen-
der, decide a defendant’s fate—the second jury would receive testimony and 
facts of a particular case with all references to gender removed. 
It is true that men commit a significantly greater number of death-eligible 
crimes.  However, when women commit similar crimes, we should not withhold 
capital punishment simply because the murderer is a mother, sister, daughter, 
or wife.  As Justice Marshall noted during the Furman debate, “[i]t is difficult to 
understand why women have received such favored treatment since the pur-
poses allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally applicable 
to both sexes.”336  To avoid the pitfalls Furman and its progeny intended to rec-
tify, the American judicial system must equalize the capital punishment system 
so that all, regardless of gender, are punished in the manner society and the le-
gal system has deemed appropriate to impose on those who callously take the 
lives of others. 
 
 335. Questions about Gender, supra note 21, at 502. 
 336. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972). 
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APPENDIX 
 
CURRENT DEATH ROW INMATES AND THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS UNDER 
WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED 
Below is a listing of each offender currently on death row,337 along with the 
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors found in each case.338 
 
State v. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 1993)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; pecuniary gain; no significant history of 
prior criminal acts. 
State v. Moore, 440 S.E.2d 797, 802 (N.C. 1994)heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 
pecuniary gain. 
State v. Parker, 553 S.E.2d 885, 890 (N.C. 2001)pecuniary gain, 
mentally/emotionally disturbed. 
State v. Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344, 349-50 (N.C. 2003)murder during capital 
felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel, murder during crime spree. 
State v. Sexton, 444 S.E.2d 879, 885 (N.C. 1994)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
State v. Marcus Robinson, 463 S.E.2d 218, 221 (N.C. 1995)murder during capital 
felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
State v. Moseley, 445 S.E.2d 906, 909 (N.C. 1994)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
State v. Thomas, 477 S.E.2d 450, 453 (N.C. 1996)murder during capital felony; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d 907, 913 (N.C. 1997)murder during capital felony; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Woods, 480 S.E.2d 647, 649 (N.C. 1997)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v.  John Davis McNeill, 485 S.E.2d 284, 286 (N.C. 1997)murder during 
capital felony. 
State v. Cagle, 488 S.E.2d 535, 540 (N.C. 1997)murder during capital felony. 
State v.  Page, 488 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. 1997)murder during crime spree; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Morganherring, 517 S.E.2d 622, 626 (N.C. 1999)murder during capital 
felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; mentally/emotionally disturbed; 
capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Elmer McNeill, 509 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1998)pecuniary gain; murder 
during crime spree. 
 
337
 The listing of offenders on North Carolina’s death row is current as of M arch 2004. 
338
 Please see Part IV(A) and note 102 for North Carolina’s aggravating and mitigating 
factors. 
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State v. Flippen, 506 S.E.2d 702, 704 (N.C. 1998)heinous, atrocious or cruel; no 
significant history of prior bad acts. 
State v. Tucker, 490 S.E.2d 559, 560 (N.C. 1997)pecuniary gain; murder during 
crime spree. 
State v. Leroy McNeil, 518 S.E.2d 486, 491 (N.C. 1999)murder during capital 
felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; mentally/emotionally disturbed; 
other mitigating factors. 
State v. Moses, 517 S.E.2d 853, 857 (N.C. 1999)murder during capital felony; 
murder during crime spree. 
State v. Frogge, 528 S.E.2d 893, 895 (N.C. 1999)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; murder during crime spree. 
State v. Golphin and Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 183-85 (N.C. 2000) murder during 
capital felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; murder during crime spree; 
age. 
State v. Thibodeaux, 532 S.E.2d 797, 800 (N.C. 2000)heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
State v. Meyer, 540 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 2000) murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; murder during crime spree; no significant 
history of prior criminal acts. 
State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 20 (N.C. 2000)heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed. 
State v. Mitchell, 543 S.E.2d 830, 833 (N.C. 2001)murder during crime spree; 
capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Fair, 557 S.E.2d 500, 507 (N.C. 2001)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; other mitigating factors. 
State v. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d 109, 119 (N.C. 2002)murder during crime spree; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed. 
State v. Hooks, 548 S.E.2d 501, 503 (N.C. 2001)heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 
capacity to appreciate impaired; no significant history of prior criminal 
acts. 
State v. Terry Robinson, 561 S.E.2d 245, 249 (N.C. 2001)murder during capital 
felony; mentally/emotionally disturbed. 
State v. Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776, 779 (N.C. 2002)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; pecuniary gain. 
State v. White, 565 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. 2002)murder during capital felony; 
pecuniary gain; mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate 
impaired; age. 
State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 620 (2002)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; murder during crime spree; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Carroll, 573 S.E.2d 899, 903 (N.C. 2002)heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 
mentally/emotionally disturbed; capacity to appreciate impaired. 
State v. Leary, 472 S.E.2d 753, 755 (N.C. 1996)murder during capital felony; 
murder during crime spree. 
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State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 379 (N.C. 1996)murder during capital felony; 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; murder during crime spree. 
 
